

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 1, Folder 1

Personal
letters, sent,
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Frame: 0001

Dear Captain Karig:

I suppose that in writing books of the type you are writing it is helpful for the public interest to quote people who were there. Frankly, I enjoy reading quotations, but in quoting, it seems proper to quote correctly. You have quoted me in your Battle Report, Victory in the Pacific, page 155, as saying that "if the intelligence reports that I have seen are true, it's just plain suicide. They tell me the entire shore up there is rimmed with heavy guns."

So far as I can recollect and I can assure you that my recollection is very good indeed, no such remarks were made. Very frankly, McCollum and I talked this over more than once during the planning stage at Leyte. I questioned his intelligence data and told him that some of it did not make sense. McCollum said that the data came from commanded guerillas in many cases by American officers left behind when the Philippines fell. That it should be good. My anxiety was not about the guns so much, although I was thoroughly concerned about them. It was about the planes and the mines. Admiral Oldendorf and I believed that there were mines there as we had swept up many at Leyte and we felt that we would encounter strong air attacks but this was talked down by Admiral Kincaid himself.

"It was surprising to make the inaccuracy of the intelligence data as regards the functions of the Bombardment, Fire Support and associated groups. There were no mine fields, no underwater obstructions, few, if any, coast defense guns, and apparently no action against surface ship fire by mobile artillery. All of these items had been the subject of numerous intelligence reports and all plans were based on their presence. In addition the command of the air, which had been forecast for our forces, simply did not obtain in the days prior to the landing."

As these are the facts how could you quote Captain McCollum as saying that they would be highly defended. He most certainly never said such a thing to Admiral Oldendorf or to me.

In fact after the battle I went over to the WASATCH and discussed the whole error of the intelligence with both McCollum and Admiral Kincaid. They said that

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it was too bad that it was so wrong and if we wanted to comment on it in our action report to do so, which we did.

I frankly admit that I am outspoken. Perhaps it is not wise to do so at any time but in war I promised myself as well as Admirals Ingersoll, Kalfbus and Pye, and I told my officers and men that I would speak out at no matter what cost if I thought that something was in error. I did this. It didn't help me, but I sleep nights.

However, I never make remarks like those you gave me. I might point out the consequences as to cost and determine what costs we were to stand but I don't say and never did say "suicide." Who does your imagining for you anyway?

I hope to read your book more fully presently. I know that you are a clever and brilliant writer and I have no doubt but that I shall spend some enjoyable hours reliving some of the battles I was in.

Please don't get too upset about my comment here. I merely wish to keep the record straight.

R. W. BATES

Captain Walter Karig, USNR
Office of Information
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

p.2 War College--military education

Education policy

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Dear Arleigh:

I received your recent letter relative to my completion of Volume V of the Battle for Leyte Gulf with a great deal of pleasure. My pleasure springs not so much from the fact that you are the Chief of Naval Operations but more correctly from the fact that it was from you--Arleigh Burke. I recognize your great qualities of leadership, your understanding of warfare and the factors which contribute to success and failure therein, your success in the field of morale and finally your dedication to your service and country. You are well loved by all!

Your comments relative to my voluntary work on Volume V are appreciated. It is quite true that I have worked long and hard since my retirement to complete the volume, but why not? I had started it long ago, I had brought it almost to completion and I would not allow it to die.

You refer to my dedication. I feel that one of the great weaknesses in the military today is the lack of dedication. Instead of it being a career, many consider it simply as a job to be dropped at the slightest sign of something which may appear financially better. Loyalty to ship, service, and country is in many cases of no consequence. You have done much to improve this situation but it still exists.

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In addition to this morale factor, you have a singularly difficult problem in the education of the incoming officer personnel. Let me quote in part from a letter from one of my former officers thereon. After commenting to me on the fact that I had constantly inculcated in him the necessity while at the Naval War College to increase (a) his brain power--his ability to reason logically, ^{and} (b) his knowledge of his profession (including of course all services therein) he stated: "They don't take this assignment seriously enough. They fail to make up through application the deficiencies in their own background and education. They are not prepared to handle properly the sensitive issues that arise and as a result a few are overburdened rectifying in many instances the errors of others. An officer should be trained for this job, if he has one of the important ones. It is almost criminal not to adequately prepare every officer who is sent here to a key billet. He must have certain pre-requisite experience and he should have special training for this assignment. Here the political, sociological and economic aspects of the problems cannot be clearly discriminated from the purely military ones. We are poorly trained for these extra-military aspects of the job."

I know that sometime this year you will be relieved from your present assignment and will then have to make a decision as to whether to accept an appointment in civil life or to remain in the active Navy. It is my fervent hope that you will decide to remain on, perhaps as SACLANT. Here your great

qualities which have helped preserve our nation during the present tough years can be equally effective in preparing our forces for instant and powerful action.

If this, for reasons unknown to me, does not appeal, have you ever thought of heading up one of these civilian study groups for at least one year where you might well have an opportunity to write about and to discuss the (a) problems of your many years of naval service and (b) many lessons thereon which you consider all of importance for today and tomorrow?

p.8 NWC

Asian Policy

George Washington University
program at NWC

Yellow Page

Naval War College Leadership

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Vice Admiral Charles Melson USN
The President
Naval War College
Newport, RI

Dear Admiral Melson:

In accordance with my usual practice, now that GSD is over, I am writing you a letter thereon, which I hope will be of some value to you.

In the first place, I don't recall when I have enjoyed my GSD more than I did this year. I don't know why, but I think that I can attribute it to the excellent organization, and to the obvious good will in my committee, and elsewhere. On the other hand, I have several comments to make which I feel are important, and which I have not encountered in past years. In this connection, this is the seventh GSD that I have attended. I was here on the staff when the concept of the GSD originated, and I was repeatedly consulted on it, but I only attended the GSD in a sketchy manner, i.e., the lectures and the plenary session with visits here and there to various committees if the committees were reported as "very good". This was because I offered my staff to Director of the GSD for duty as inspectors of committees, while I remained in my office to write my books in quiet.

And now for some general comments.

a. Administrative -

(1) Luncheons: My moderator, COL L. D. Baughman,

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USMC, handled this very well indeed. While I did not attend all of the luncheons for my committee, the moderator so arranged them as to give the civilian guests and the flag and general officers a broad picture of Navy life on different levels as well as an understanding of the design of our ~~weakness~~ ^{WARSHIPS} today, and of the changes made therein by the demands of modern warfare. On Monday, they lunched in the Naval Station General Mess -- on Tuesday, as your guests at the COM (open), on Wednesday, in the LPH Guadalcanal and on Thursday, in the CL Long Beach.

(2) Dinners -- here my committee dined together as a committee on Monday night at the COM (open), on Tuesday night at a clambake given by a professional group at King Philips Clambake in Bristol; on Wednesday night at the Clambake Club where the civilians and reserve officers entertained the students and staff, and on Thursday night at the stag dinner at the COM (open). All of these dinners were a great success. This includes the clambake at King Philips Clambake, above referred to, which, while a very poor example of a clambake (there was no clam chowder -- the lobsters were boiled and were tough, the corn was old and tough) proved to be a very happy affair with good will evidenced by

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all. I wonder if Kempenaars Clambake Cub in Middletown might not do a better job for the price. (\$5.00)

In connection with the entertainment, I think that having an overall coordinator proved to be an excellent one, and the coordinator is certainly deserving of considerable credit for the obviously able manner in which this phase of the GSD was handled.

(3) Cash guideline -

For the first time in recent years, I did not hear anything at all about cash guidelines. I think *had been given freedom of action in this regard and* that this meant that the moderators *are* were using sound judgement which, after all, is common sense.

(4) President's Stag Dinner -

So far as I could judge, this was a very popular innovation in that the participants were afforded an opportunity to hear several excellent speakers, and especially Vice Admiral Ruthven Libby (retired), and were then able to go home fairly early in the evening. There were, of course, drawbacks. Among these were the facts that (a) the loud speakers were not loud enough, so that it was difficult to hear over the "chit chat" of some of the guests, and (b) the omission of the "ball" of previous years denied the feminine element a chance to participate in what might be termed a farewell affair. *for all.* I should be interested

in learning what the reaction of the students and staff ~~were~~ ^{were} ~~came~~ to this innovation.

(b) Professional -

(1) Committee method of operation -

My committee operated in a very different manner than did my committees in past years. This was because my moderator, who was personally excellent and well informed, did not choose to operate as recommended in the Moderators Handbook, but instead largely relegated himself to the position of "back up" moderator. He assigned one of the students as moderator for each specific subject, directed this moderator to present a short discussion of the subject for that period, and, all in all, allowed the several moderators to conduct the meetings. ^{while he watched the proceedings with a critical eye.} Having been associated with the standard method, wherein the committee moderator conducts all meetings directly, I feel that the method employed in my committee this year was not as effective as the standard method.

My moderator maintained a record of each day's discussions for our committee alone. I must repeat here what I have said in past years, to wit -- that

the maintenance of this record is highly important, not only for the committee, but also ~~for~~ the Director of GSD, who can thereby observe the rate of progress of the different committees, something probably difficult to obtain from the staff representative ⁵ in the various committees, *and can take any necessary action.*

(2) Lectures -

The lectures were all excellent, although some were better than others. I thought that the ~~addresses~~ ^{the} ~~performances~~ of Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Horatio Rivero, and of the Secretary of the Navy, The Honorable Paul Nitze, were the most scholarly, although the Secretary's background material was perhaps too

was not read very well, and in many cases "went over the heads" of the audience.

long. On the other hand, since ~~his~~ ^{the Secretary's} address was ~~in a~~ ^{so called} large part, a departure from the Korean White Paper and was an explanation of the administration's reasons ^{doing today} for ~~our present method of operating in Vietnam~~ ^{what we failed to do in Korea, and} ~~and~~ ^{since} since many of the audience were high level representatives from different sections of the United States, his stressing of the background seems ^{not only} realistic ^{but necessary}.

The least successful of the guest lecturers was Dr. Gardner Ackley, who discussed the National Economy. While his address seemed to cover the subject adequately -- albeit it was along the lines of Keynesian economy and the so-called party line

-- his question-and-answer period was very poor indeed. His unwillingness to answer most of the questions showed a high lack of appreciation of the caliber of the audience, and of their clearance for "Secret" material. ~~I don't recommend inviting Dr. Ackley again!~~

(3) As was the case last year, the 0830 daily intelligence briefings were very popular indeed and enjoyed a high standing with the civilian guests, in particular.

(4) I thought that our civilian guests this year were of high quality. I met ^{a number} ~~many~~ of them. ~~I~~ and was told repeatedly ~~by them~~ of the great value to them of the GSD. The civilians in my own committee ^{and seemed to enjoy the privilege.} contributed freely and ~~adequately~~. We really had only two civilians: one, the Superintendent of the Fairless Works of the U.S. Steel; the other, a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission. Our third civilian, the Head of American Factors in ^{HAWAII} ~~Haiwan~~ was, at the last minute, unable to attend. Since I have long suggested that there should be four civilian representatives in each committee, I feel that the absence of ^{this} ~~the~~ third civilian was heavily felt.

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(c) Plenary Session -

This session repeated what I choose to call the error of last year's session, in that, once again, the panel consisted of seven members. I think that this year's panel did an excellent job, but I cannot but feel that it would have been more effective had it been limited to four, or five members including the moderator. This is particularly true when one considers the short time (one hour) in which it was operative. As you well know, practically all panels on TV use four members and a moderator. If the panel were to run from say 0900 to 1200, then, perhaps, a seven-man panel might be in order. As it was in this case, I felt that not only was the panel too large, but several of the members were of little value. This is the weakness of an emergency panel like this, for no one can really foretell what the various members of the panel will contribute, to the

session. *The problem of the "mikes" continues to be with us. The necessity for using a "mike" to*

(d) Erratic ideas -

For a time, during my committee sessions, the committee was discussing our policy in Vietnam. To my great surprise, a significant number were calling

the question to all, causes long delays. This year was a great improvement with the "mike" talkers. But it seems to me that we should at least double the number of talkers. I should be doubled at the very minimum.

for the removal of our forces from the Asian Continent -- in other words, to leave Asia to the Chinese Communists. In doing this, they repeatedly referred to Hans Morgenthau, who is one of the advocates of this policy. I immediately challenged those who held this view, and was told that it "came from The George Washington course for a Master's Degree here at the Naval War College, and that those who followed this line got "fine marks." Frankly, although I feel strongly that members of committees should be free to express their views, and are expected to do so, this shook me, and convinced me, if nothing else had, that the GW Course ~~should be abolished here, and reexamined elsewhere.~~ *was out of place here in the Naval War College.*

(e) Recommendations -

(1) Committees

(1) All committees should not only maintain daily records of their discussions, but these records should be made available each day to the Director of the GSD.

(2) Bureau Section

(a) A return to the old practice of having one committee present their findings might *(On past years we have ~~been~~ used, on occasions, two committees)* be helpful. *↑* This might impress on the various committees

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In fact my committee took Thursday afternoon off for pursuits such as there thus heavily reducing the already very limited time available for committee work.

the necessity for making the best mentally of their time here. This is important as there is an increasing tendency to move away from the basic concept of GSD,

and to employ the time in other pursuits, such as *or looking over Newport, or taking too much time at lunch* golf, or even in inspecting new ships, such as the

APH Guadalcanal. *Is this the present day concept of GSD?* This is not my concept of GSD, nor

was it the original basic concept. The basic concept as I recall

VIP it was to invite civilians in order to *acquire with them an understanding of the problems confronting the US in formulating modern national and military strategy and to better* a global strategy *→ these strategies in a* prepare them as exponents of national and military

non classified sense)

strategy in their home areas. It was also to inform

them, through close association *of the high quality of* with our students,

our staff, and our reserve officers, *of their high*

quality. In return, *the latter students, staff and reserve officers* were to gain a

VIP broader view of the attitudes of civilian leaders

toward *global strategy* these strategies, and toward the military in

general. Thus there *should* be a "give and a take" from which our Nation could not fail to gain increased security.

(b) It is also recommended that *if membership of the panel is reduced to two including the moderator.*

Finally,

Naval Command

Qualifications for high command

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General

(1) Having attended seven of these GSDs as a member of a committee, and having associated freely with the guests both civilian and ~~reserve~~ officers, I have ~~as firmly~~ ^{today as I was yesterday} ~~convinced~~ ^{of the importance of these discussions.} ~~My reason~~. However ~~the~~ since they were originated here at the Naval War College seventeen years ago, and have since been copied by all of our sister military war colleges, it becomes incumbent upon the Naval War College to continue that leadership by originality of effort. It would be interesting to know how the other war colleges are conducting their discussions. Have we ~~anything to~~ Has the Naval War College anything to learn from them? ~~Some competition~~ What changes are we contemplating in our GSD so that we may not only retain our leadership, but will maintain a ^{continuing} high interest in all of our committees ~~which at present~~ throughout all meetings.

(2) Finally, I wish to say that I am grateful that you approved my name for inclusion this year. I certainly enjoyed it.

W. P. Jones.

12 Mt Vernon N

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**MISSING
PAGE(S)**

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over to testify as to the good character of the defendants, one of whom in recent years became a very successful combat Vice Admiral. I think that only one midshipman was fired!

As regards item (b) I think that the Naval Academy has not only been cognizant of its weaknesses, but has made every effort to correct them. But, as the world changes, as policies change, as weapons change, as the methods of educational instruction change throughout the land, the necessity for not only keeping abreast of the times but for even setting the standards as well, is basic.

As you know, I have written a number of battle analyses wherein I endeavored to stress the great importance of the COMMANDER and of the effect his decisions has had on the success or failure of an operation. The importance of the COMMANDER at the Naval Academy cannot be over emphasized, and yet during my naval career, there have been Superintendents who in the opinion of the Service did not measure up to the requirements of the office.

Very frankly, I do not know what the High Command considers these requirements to be today, but in my mind they are

- (a) a high moral character -
- (b) a fine appearance -
- (c) outstanding military reputation not only on paper, but also in the eyes of the general public -- in other words, PRESTIGE -
- (d) high mental and educational attainments, and finally, and of the greatest importance,
- (e) the ability to make correct decisions and the courage to execute them without delay.

It was because of items (b) and (c) that I had hoped after W W II that Admiral Thomas Kinkaid would be made Superintendent (I have always understood that he wanted it).

As regards item (e) I think that it can be stated in all fairness that most of the trouble recently at the University of California was the lack of these

very factors on the part of the President of the University, who is essentially a compromiser. What was needed was a decisive leader! And how can one compromise dishonor!

Because of all of this, I think that the choice of Draper Kauffman to be the new Superintendent is a most wise decision, and one which will pay national dividends. Therefore, I want to congratulate the Navy on this choice and Draper Kauffman on his selection.

And, finally, I should like to invite attention to Reminiscences by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, part IV, pages 77 to 83, inclusive, wherein he discusses his actions as Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy. Since we are all working with human beings, many of his thoughts therein might have an applicability today.

With hopes that you will forgive an old timer for taking the liberty of writing to you in this fashion, and once again with congratulations, I am as ever,

Your old friend,

Richard W. Bates
Rear Admiral USN (ret)

Rear Admiral Draper Kauffman USN
Office of the Secretary
of the Navy
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Washington 25, D. C.

RWB mv

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